


Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

21 February 1984

Executive Director

NOTE FOR THE DCI
DDCI

- ° Like Mr. Stein, I agree with some of this, but am much less pessimistic. And I would not like to see us beat the bushes for a State Dept. model.
- ° Let me call to your attention the attached rough note from a non-attributed DO-experienced source in my office.


Charles A. Briggs

1) ~~OK~~
2) ~~return for~~
→ inclusion in
DDO goals
pkg?

Some unsound hypotheses. Some unfounded conclusions.

We no doubt need a CS. It does and should exist psychologically - in esprit - not in bureaucratic trappings. If we are becoming unglued - which is questionable - what we may need is a little more attention by middle to upper management to what is being thought about down through the ranks. Esprit comes from real accomplishment. Officers who are recruiting, reporting valuable information, and making a difference are ^{likely to be} not looking for more pay now or for retirement.

State Dept certainly is not an organization to copy.

Our employees may be as good at entrance as ever. Certainly they are getting overseas early, have more responsibility at an early age, are doing more important things in a more dangerous world

If the institution of the CS is sound, which it is, what is needed is more communication both downward and upward. Less paper. Less regulation. Fewer unnecessary administrative reporting exercises. More sessions in small groups between the working level and the SIS. [REDACTED]

Ideas need to be tapped from the bottom.
An occasional reassurance that pay, benefits and perks are comparable to elsewhere - that nobody is taking advantage of our employees' dedication and loyalty - ~~is an important part of~~ is essential to the communication process. [REDACTED] comments are somewhat of an indictment of how this process is working. A little fine tuning, not bureaucratic reform, nevertheless, is what is needed.

THE CLASSIFIED NEWSLETTER IS AN EXCELLENT IDEA.

ILLEGIB
ILLEGIB

25X1

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

A CLANDESTINE SERVICE?

FROM:

6B02 HQS

EXTENSION

NO.

ER 84-880

DATE

1 February 1984

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Chief,
6B02 HQS

2 Feb

[Signature]

2.

3.

4. DDO

[Signature]

[Signature]

5.

6. EXDIR

21 FEB 1984

[Signature]

7.

DDCI

8.

9. DCI

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

We believe that it contains imaginative and incisive suggestions in areas of concern to all DO professionals. By happy coincidence, it has arrived at the same time as the DCI has solicited such thoughts from us. We believe that he will consider it worthy of serious consideration.

4-7, 9: I agree with the thrust. Some specifics relate, not solve, problems - [Signature]



S E C R E T

27 December 1983

A CLANDESTINE SERVICE?

For decades we have thought of ourselves as a Clandestine Service and have called ourselves officers. Yet there is no such organization and we are not officers of the U.S. Government. Other than different retirement benefits, which are not necessarily the best the U.S. Government has to offer, there is little that differentiates us from many other Civil Service employees. We are not commissioned officers, and we have no clandestine service organization. In fact, we are simply another component of the Central Intelligence Agency. Whatever bound us together in the past and attracted new blood is no longer working well; the glue that held us together and created an esprit de corps is weakening as older hands retire.

We now have considerable difficulty in recruiting and retaining new employees. Since the Department of State does not have the same problem to the same degree, one cannot blame increasing terrorism, more generalized hazards of overseas service, or a lack of interest in serving abroad as causes. While one can fault our public image, there appears to be a much more basic problem of incentives. Because we cannot offer the more public prestige of the Department of State, we must find alternative incentives - and at least equally attractive ones - to entice and hold our young people. This is particularly important as more is demanded of Directorate of Operations staffers than of most U.S. Government employees.

We should be able to assure our applicants and new employees that, if they qualify, they are joining the very best, most elite service in the U.S. Government. Incentives and rewards must also match that claim. To start, we should create a Clandestine Service, modelled on the Department of State's Service. Its officers, holding Presidential Commissions, will staff the Directorate of Operations from desk through Division as they rotate between field and Headquarters assignments. Other personnel staffing our Stations and Bases will also belong to the Service. Officers choosing to stay at home beyond a certain length of time would convert to GS status. Logically, the Deputy Director for Operations would head the Service.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

To foster a sense of belonging, we could periodically provide to Service installations a sanitized summary of key intelligence accomplishments, e.g., major recruitments, terrorist acts prevented, coups abetted or prevented, as well as kudos and awards. We might emulate the Department of State with a periodic, classified newsletter. We might also circulate by cable the promotion lists which are available for perusal at Headquarters. Perhaps we could even reduce the bureaucracy and regulations in order to treat the Service like a responsible entity made up of responsible, dedicated individuals. Other officers will have more and better ideas.

25X1

The point of this little essay is that, increasingly, we get what we pay for. The work is fun and the concept of service is not dead, but we must create and foster a modern Clandestine Service with spirit and incentives to match the demands placed on us. We like to think that we are the best; to attract and retain the best, we must also offer the best. To do less will lower us to the level of the general civil service masses.

25X1